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Abstract 
While the global economic environment has changed considerably from end-
2011 to the present for advanced and emerging economies alike, the themes and 
policy issues addressed by these papers share a timeless dimension. 
Collectively, the studies that comprise this volume deal with various aspects of 
the causes, consequences, and policy challenges associated with the repeated 
boom-bust cycles that have characterized market economies throughout most of 
their history.  The papers have a decided open-economy focus and connect the 
prosperity-crisis-depression cycle to international capital flows and their impact 
on domestic and external indebtedness, currency fluctuations, and the banking 
sector; their connection to global factors, such as international interest rates, 
commodity prices and crises or turbulence outside the national borders is 
explored.  While the analysis is tilted towards emerging markets—particularly 
in Latin America, the relevance of these topics for mature economies has been 
made plain by the Global Financial Crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The versión in spanish, titled  
MOVILIDAD DE CAPITALES Y POLÍTICA MONETARIA: 
CONSIDERACIONES GENERALES appeared in Journal Economía Chilena, 
Banco Central de Chile, Vol. 18(1), April 2015, 50-67. 
The authors edited Capital Mobility and Monetary Policy, Series on Central 
Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies, Volume 18. 
Santiago: Banco Central de Chile, 2014) 
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I. Introduction 
 
 The papers that comprise the different chapters of this volume were 
presented in the XVII Annual Conference on Central Banking that took place at 
the Central Bank of Chile, Santiago,  during November 14 and 15, 2011.   
 While the global economic environment has changed considerably from 
end-2011 to the present for advanced and emerging economies alike, the themes 
and policy issues addressed by these papers share a timeless dimension. 
Collectively, the studies that comprise this volume deal with various aspects of 
the causes, consequences, and policy challenges associated with the repeated 
boom-bust cycles that have characterized market economies throughout most of 
their history.  The papers have a decided open-economy focus and connect the 
prosperity-crisis-depression cycle to international capital flows and their impact 
on domestic and external indebtedness, currency fluctuations, and the banking 
sector; their connection to global factors, such as international interest rates, 
commodity prices and crises or turbulence outside the national borders is 
explored.  While the analysis is tilted towards emerging markets—particularly 
in Latin America, the relevance of these topics for mature economies has been 
made plain by the Global Financial Crisis. 
II. The evolving global setting 
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 At the time of the conference, the global outlook was notably brighter for 
emerging markets as a group while many (if not most) advanced economies 
continued to struggle with the aftermath of systemic banking crises. After a 
relatively promising 2010 and much discussion in policy circles of “green 
shoots, “growth prospects for the United States, Japan, and especially Europe  
were being revised downwards.  The depth of the financial, fiscal, and 
structural problems in the Euro Area became more apparent and the probability 
of a quick resolution slimmer.  A novel element in the global setting was the 
relative resilience of emerging markets in the face of the financial meltdown in 
the “North.” The relatively swift and sharp recovery in emerging markets 
following the global turmoil of 2008-early 2009 posed a striking contrast to the 
1930s when deep financial crises in the United States and Europe ushered in 
years (if not decades) of economic contraction and stagnation in the “South.”  
 In both advanced and emerging economies, policymakers, academics, and 
the financial community were still trying to understand the financial tsunami 
that hit them in late 2008 and the channels through which the US Subprime 
mortgage crisis became viral and global almost synchronously. By 2011, the 
reverberations of the crisis in Europe were becoming clearer as the banking 
crises morphed into a sovereign debt crises in a growing number of “periphery” 
countries (which now also included Spain and Italy—in addition to Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal). 1 The range of options under discussion for dealing and 
solving the fiscal and lack of international competitiveness problems of 
                                                 
1 Iceland, which also lost access to international capital markets, would be added to this 
group if non-euro zone countries are included in the casualty list. See Reinhart and Rogoff 
(this volume) on the connection between banking and debt crises. 
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countries in the periphery  included discussions of the relative merits of  the 
exit  from (if not dissolution of) the euro. 
 Emerging markets could not rely on history to provide a comparable turn 
of events to the Global Financial Crisis. At the height of the global crisis, 
capital flows to these countries predictably dried up overnight.  Paradoxically 
financial flows fled to the epicenter of the crisis (the United States) in search of 
safety (and/or liquidity). However, unlike other crises episodes, the sudden stop 
did not last long for emerging markets and flows started to recover vigorously 
in the second half of 2009, largely unaffected by the problems in Europe.2  In 
effect, as periphery Europe slid into a sovereign debt crisis of varying 
magnitudes and capital market access was lost, global investors in their eternal 
quest for higher yields increasingly saw emerging markets as the most attractive 
destination in an otherwise bleak global setting. 
 Commodity prices also followed a somewhat atypical  pattern.  
Historically, recessions in the United States and the larger advanced economies 
are associated with declining commodity prices. 3 Yet, after a precipitous but 
short-lived decline in late 2008, prices of primary commodities recovered and 
surpassed their pre-crisis levels.  
 All in all, with a few exceptions, emerging market economies were able 
to recover faster than advanced ones and sustain consistently higher rates of 
economic growth, which led some analysts to refer to the situation as a "two 
                                                 
2 For the original sudden stop concept see Calvo (1998). 
 
3 This North-South link has a long-standing history, as discussed in Dornbusch (1985). 
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speed world"(need a reference here).  The two-speed world view was re-
enforced by the increasing realization that the recovery of advanced economies 
would not be quick and that private deleveraging and mounting fiscal problems 
(most marked in periphery Europe) could lead to a protracted recession. The 
lack of “fiscal space” to stimulate demand in advanced economies as time 
progressed and public debts marched upward meant that advanced economies 
looked increasingly to external demand to fuel the recovery. Emerging 
economies, with their comparatively stronger economic performance, were the 
natural source of that demand. However, to act as the global engine of growth 
emerging markets had to be willing to run larger trade and current account 
deficits, tolerate a more appreciated currency, and finance those deficits with 
potentially unstable capital inflows.  The search for yield in emerging markets 
was fueled further by expansive monetary policies in the United States and 
other advanced economies. In effect, after 2008 real ex-post short-term interest 
rates in the advanced economies were negative roughly ½ of the time (a 
phenomenon not seen since the late 1970s). 
 Owing to the sudden and drastic reversal of capital flows in late 2008 and 
the countless previous experiences with similar reversals over the course of 
history has led many emerging markets to be wary of “fickle financial flows.”4  
In a setting in which capital flows are seen as potential harbingers of financial 
instability it is not surprising that the policy discussion and academic research  
                                                 
4 As also highlighted in the IMF World Economic Outlook (2011), this balancing act was not 
occurring in an ordered fashion, with Latin American countries bearing a disproportionate 
share of the adjustment. 
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pursued a line of inquiry involving interrelated questions such as:  What are the 
mechanisms behind the surge in capital inflows experienced by emerging 
markets before the crisis and after 2009? What are the consequences of such 
inflows—same as prior episodes or are there new dimensions? What are the 
main channels of transmission of financial crises and what determines resilience 
to external turbulence? And, importantly, How should policy respond to these 
inflows and related effects  so as to avoid the buildup of financial vulnerability 
at home?  
 The rest of this overview chapter  reviews selective highlights of these 
articles and their contribution to the discussion and literature on capital 
mobility, north-south linkages, financial crises, and macroeconomic policy. The 
chapter will be structured around the potential phases of the capital flow cycle: 
the rise (or bonanza), the demise (or reversal), and the policy reactions to either 
deal with “excessive” inflows or disorderly outflows. 
III.The rise in capital inflows (with an emphasis on Latin America) 
Both, between 2003 and 2008 and again between 2009-2012, emerging 
economies were recipients of large inflows of capital. The earlier wave of 
inflows prior to the Global Financial Crisis and also for the years 2009 and 
2010 were not primarily directed to the financing of ever-widening current 
account deficits. Burnt by severe crises since the mid-1990s emerging markets 
had embraced self-insurance and the earlier wave of capital flows was 
importantly channeled into reserve accumulation (which set new records for 
many emerging markets—not just China). This use of inflows was also 
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representative for countries in Latin America as can be seen in the current 
account balances that appear in Table 1. Current account surpluses are 
comparatively rare in Latin American countries.  
 The nearly balanced current account shown in Table 1 for the Euro Area 
masks another surge in capital inflows that had taken place prior to the 2008 
crisis. Periphery Europe along with Iceland, the United Kingdom and the United 
States were recording record current account deficits financed by increased 
borrowing from abroad—also in record volume. By 2008, Iceland’s current 
account deficit was 28 percent of GDP, Greece’s was 15 percent and Portugal 
and Spain’s current account deficits were in 9 to 13 percent range.  Like many 
capital flow bonanza episodes of the past, this one would end just as badly. 
 The trends in the current account directly map to the observed trends and 
important regional differences in external indebtedness. 
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Table 1. Current Account Balances, 2003-2012 
(as a percent of GDP) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In contrast to previous periods of global economic turmoil, Latin 
America was remarkably well positioned to weather the headwinds of the Great 
Recession. Nowhere was this better seen than in a comparison of global external 
debt figures. As Figure 1 demonstrates, Latin America had among the lowest 
levels of external debt in the world during the six years preceding the financial 
crisis. Not only that, but Latin America was deleveraging at an extraordinary 
fast pace, resulting in debt levels the rivaled those of the early 1970s, among 
the brightest periods of Latin American economic growth.  
Figure1 (from Reinhart and Rogoff, Chapter xx) is based on 2003-2009 
gross external debt as a percent of GDP.  The left hand panel of the figure 
indicates whether there has been an increase in indebtedness to GDP over the 
2003-2009 period, or a decrease (deleveraging).   The right hand panel gives the 
Country Group  
2003-
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Pls 
Add 
2012 
Advanced Economies -0.88 -1.14 -0.14 -0.02 -0.17 
 United States -5.38 -4.74 -2.73 -3.05 -3.09 
 Euro Area 0.63 -0.71 0.25 0.53 0.60 
 Emerging and Developing 
Economies 3.35 3.52 1.47 1.53 1.90 
 Developing Asia 4.31 5.85 3.72 2.47 1.58 
 Latin America and the 
Caribbean 0.90 -0.90 -0.71 -1.21 -1.34 
 Japan 3.86 3.30 2.91 3.71 2.02 
 China 6.14 9.31 4.87 4.01 2.76 
 Brazil 1.09 -1.71 -1.50 -2.21 -2.11 
 Chile 2.35 -3.23 2.05 1.48 -1.31 
 Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2013. 
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ratio of gross external debt to GDP as of the end of the second quarter of 2009. 
The group averages are based on a total data set of 59 countries.   
Figure 1.Gross External Debt as a Percent of GDP: Averages for Selected 59 
Countries, 2003-2009 
(in percent) 
 
Sources:  International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook , World, Bank, Quarterly 
External Debt Statistics (QEDS), and authors’ calculations. 
Notes:  Data for 2009 end in the second quarter.  The countries participating in QEDS 
included in these calculations are listed in what follows by region. Advanced-Europe:  
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, (15 countries). If Ireland were 
included, the averages would be substantially higher for this group;  Emerging Europe: 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, and Turkey, (11 countries). Former Soviet Union:  Armenia, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, and the Ukraine (8 countries). 
Africa: Egypt, South Africa, and Tunisia (3 countries).  Asia-Emerging: Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand (6 countries). Latin America:  Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,  El Salvador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and 
Uruguay (12 countries). There are a total of 19 advanced economies and 40 emerging 
markets. 
 
  As the right hand side of the figure illustrates, external debt burdens at 
the time of the crisis were particularly high in Europe, with an average external 
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debt to GDP ratio across advanced European economies of over 200 percent, 
and an average external debt to GDP across emerging European economies 
roughly 100 percent.  A sizable share of the debt is intra-European, but 
nonetheless external to the country.  
Famously profligate Latin America, by contrast to the advanced 
economies, at the time of the global crisis had gross external debt liabilities 
averaging only around 50 percent of GDP.   Moreover, in contrast to the 
advanced countries who added an average of 50 percent of GDP to gross 
external debt during the recent period, Latin American countries actually 
reduced external debt by more than 30 percent of GDP.  
 Importantly, Latin America lowered its foreign currency liabilities and 
shifted away from dollarized to domestic-denominated debt, avoiding one of the 
major pitfalls of emerging market borrowing. Current accounts (as noted) for 
most of the region were in surplus, a relative rarity for the region. Indeed, 
domestic conditions in Latin America were so strong that one could not find a 
newspaper in the fall of 2008 and in 2009 that ran an article about the 
possibility of default in Latin America as a result of the global economic 
meltdown--itself a rarity. 
 This sharp deleveraging in the run-up to 2008-2009 is thus intimately 
connected with the drought in capital inflows to the region for several years 
prior to 2003. The low levels of external public and private debt at the outbreak 
of the crisis and the resilience of Latin America in particular and emerging 
markets in general to the crisis of the North importantly catalyzed further 
capital inflows to emerging markets after the crisis. As the inflows persisted 
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beyond 2010, current account surpluses became smaller eventually giving way 
to deficits in a number of countries. Old vulnerabilities have re-emerged. 
 
1. The drivers of capital inflows: Push or Pull? 
   
There is a considerable literature dating back to the early 1990s on whether 
capital flows to and from emerging markets are primarily driven by external or 
“push” factors such as international interest rates, commodity prices and 
general economic conditions in the world’s financial centers or domestic “pull” 
forces, which often cite structural reforms, inflation stabilization, financial 
liberalization, or comparatively favorable domestic economic conditions in the 
recipient country. 5  
The articles by Forbes and Warnock, Fratchzer, Mendoza and Terrones, and 
Shin (chapters x, x, x, and x, respectively) in this volume, contribute to this 
body of work. 
 In the context of the post global financial crisis surge in capital flows to 
emerging markets, the actual and expected growth differential between 
advanced and emerging economies previously discussed figured prominently 
among the pull factors cited. It provided international investors with a strong 
incentive to invest in emerging markets. Of course, this growth differential does 
not trace out to what extent the accommodative monetary policies in the 
advanced economies, with its attendant low interest rates and ample global 
                                                 
5 For a discussion and comprehensive bibliography of of capital flow bonanzas and their 
causes, see Frankel (2011). 
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liquidity helped emerging market growth. After all, emerging banking markets 
did not suffer from the domestic credit market dislocations associated with deep 
banking crises.  Furthermore,  some of the recipients of large inflows were 
commodity producers that benefited from the quick and sharp rebound in 
commodity prices observed after the crisis. The strength in commodity prices 
amid widespread recession in advanced economies is often linked to China’s 
spectacular and sustained high rates of growth. Owing to a common view that 
China was in the process of internal rebalancing and that the country would 
remain in the high growth path of recent year, the strength in commodity prices 
was perceived as relatively persistent, leading to relatively high medium-run 
growth forecasts for these economies as depicted in the IMF projections from 
April 2011 shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Real GDP Growth and projections in 2011. 
    
Projections 
Country Group  
03-
08 2009 2010 2011 2012 2016 
World 4.4 -0.7 5.1 4.4 4.5 4.7 
Advanced Economies 2.3 -3.4 3.0 2.4 2.6 2.4 
United States 2.3 -2.6 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.7 
Euro Area 1.9 -4.1 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.7 
Emerging and Dev 
Economies 7.4 2.8 7.3 6.5 6.5 6.8 
Developing Asia 9.3 7.2 9.5 8.4 8.4 8.6 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 4.7 -1.7 6.1 4.7 4.2 3.9 
Japan 1.5 -6.3 3.9 1.4 2.1 1.2 
China 11.3 9.2 10.3 9.6 9.5 9.5 
Brazil 4.2 -0.6 7.5 4.5 4.1 4.2 
Chile 4.7 –1.7 5.3 5.9 4.9 4.3 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 
2011. 
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The rebound in economic performance in emerging markets also resulted in the 
normalization of interest rates, which, ceteris paribus, provided an additional 
pull factor for international capital.  
 
 Finally, the resilience showed by many emerging economies to the 
financial crisis also served to highlight their improved fiscal position (to some 
extent this is reflected the in previous discussion on the significant reduction in 
public external debt), financial regulation, and institutional frameworks. While 
these improvements were fruit of policies taken after the onset of the Asian and 
Russian financial crises, they had not been tested yet, and the relatively mild 
impact of the crisis in some of these countries validated these policies in the 
eyes of international investors.  
 
 Despite all the pull factors mentioned above, the coincidence of capital 
inflows with the large monetary policy expansions in advanced economies, 
record lows in nominal (and often real) interest rates, the apparent 
synchronicity and commonality showed by these inflows across countries, and 
the difficulties sorting whether the pull factors mentioned above were a cause or 
a consequence of the flows led many to view the latest episode of surging 
capital inflows to emerging markets as another example where pull factors 
associated  played a crucial role in explaining the pattern of reallocation of 
global capital flows.  
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In principle, both push and pull factors can be cyclical (temporary) and subject 
to reversals.  In practice, there is a tendency to view domestic policy reforms 
and institutional changes as less transitory than interest cycles in the United 
States and other financial centers or fluctuations in world commodity prices. 
Thus, the extent to which push and pull factors could explain the pattern of 
capital flows remains an important research question--not just to understand the 
past but to ascertain the odds of future reversals and their attendant 
macroeconomic dislocations.  
 Forbes and Warnock (chapter x) build on their previous work on the 
characterization and determinants of gross capital flows.6 While most research 
on capital mobility during the 1990s focused on net capital flows—the 
difference between the inflows by non-residents and the outflows of residents—
the crisis made apparent that the gross positions behind these net flows could 
shed important light on the nature of sudden capital movements, and also that 
gross positions were potentially more important for financial stability concerns 
that net positions.  This point has also been recently stressed by Broner et. al. 
(2013). 
 In an earlier contribution, Forbes and Warnock (2012) use data on gross 
inflows and outflows to characterize episodes of waves in net capital flows into 
surges, stops, starts, and retrenchments. In this taxonomy, surges and stops 
correspond to large gross inflows or outflows of capital by non-residents into a 
                                                 
6  See Forbes and Warnock,( 2012). 
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country, respectively. Starts and retrenchments, on the other hand, are large 
gross outflows and inflows of capital by a country’s residents.  Therefore, a 
large decline in net capital flows may result from a stop or a start depending on 
whether non-residents or residents are taking their capital out of the country.  
Conversely, a large increase in net capital flows may result from a surge or a 
retrenchment. Also, small movements in net capital flows may mask large 
movements in gross positions between residents and non-residents. In chapter x, 
the authors extend their previous work using quarterly data on capital flows 
between 1980 and 2009 to analyze the characteristics of large capital flow 
episodes before and during the crisis. A key finding is that the majority of the 
more extreme episodes are fueled by debt flows rather than equity flows. Their 
analysis shows that equity-led flows respond mainly to country specific factors 
and are largely unaffected by measures of global risk or other determinants of 
contagion.  In contrast, debt-led flows are mainly related to global factors and 
regional contagion, with county-level factors associated mainly with growth 
shocks playing a secondary role. 
 A significant empirical regularity in Forbes and Warnock analysis is \ 
that extreme episodes of capital flows are largely debt-related and associated 
with global factors and regional contagion. Among global factors, the authors 
find that global risk and interest rates are the most important determinants of 
extreme debt-related capital flow episodes. The strong association between debt 
flows, capital flow volatility, external factors, and contagion  are in line with 
the discussion in Reinhart and Rogoff who connect surges in external debt to 
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banking crises (and often sovereign debt crises)—with the most extreme 
illustrations coming from advanced economies (particularly the cases of Iceland 
and Ireland) 
 These findings suggest an important role of push factors in the rise of 
capital inflows to emerging market countries. However, they also mask some 
heterogeneity in the type of global factor related to each different type of 
episodes. In fact, while both, risk and interest rates are associated with stops, 
surges are related mainly to global risk and growth. According to these results, 
global interest rates did not play a major role in the probability of a surge of 
inflows into a country. 
 Further evidence on the role of push factors for capital flows comes from 
Mendoza and Terrones, (chapter x). While this paper focuses on characterizing 
the cyclical patterns around episodes of credit booms, an interesting finding is 
that credit booms tend to be synchronized internationally, and sometimes 
culminates around “big events,” such as the Asian and Russian crises, and the 
2008 Global Financial Crisis. Since the authors also find that credit booms tend 
to be triggered by surges in capital inflows, it follows that these surges are, to 
an important extent, concentrated in time across countries, hinting at the 
presence of common push factors. Nonetheless, Mendoza and Terrones, also 
find that credit booms have important domestic sources and are often preceded 
by TFP gains and financial reforms, although with less frequency among 
emerging than in advanced countries. 
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 Other recent studies have tried to determine the relative importance of 
push and pull factors. For instance, Fratzscher (2012) uses monthly data on 
capital flows from international mutual funds to study the role of push and pull 
factors in determining such inflows during 2005 to 2011. His results show that 
both types of factors matter although pull factors or those related to common 
global economic conditions were the most important ones especially before the 
onset of the crisis. Domestic or pull factors gained prominence only after the 
recovery had begun. In a related study, Fratzscher, Lo Duca and Straub (2013) 
use an event study methodology to study the role of quantitative easing QE 
announcements on international equity and bond flows, prices and yields. They 
find that both QE programs had noticeable effects on the global value of the 
dollar and induced relevant portfolio across national borders. The 
announcement by the Federal Reserve of their intent to “taper” QE policies in 
the spring of 2013 (which would constitute another event study in the 
Fratzscher Lo Luca approach) set in motion a far reaching sell-off of emerging 
market currencies and financial assets. One can only speculate that this event 
may have marked the end of the most recent capital flow bonanza era in 
emerging markets and would lend further support to their earlier findings.  
 Hyun Shin’s chapter in this volume also identifies push factors (under the 
umbrella of global liquidity) as a key contributor to the surge of cross border 
capital flows observed in the second half of the 2000s and post global financial 
crisis. He highlights the central role of commercial banks in funneling funds 
from countries where liquidity was abundant, especially the U.S. bank funding 
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market, to countries where expansionary macroeconomic policies were creating 
massive demand for those resources. This transmission mechanism also reminds 
us of the importance of policy spillovers and how they can be amplified by 
private banks (or, more generally financial institutions).As discussed in the 
section on policy the behavior of cross border lending through commercial 
banks observed during the buildup to the 2008 financial crises, helps to draw 
important lessons for the design of regulations that make economies less prone 
to these costly disruptions. 
  All in all, the existing evidence regarding the determinants of capital 
inflows to countries points to both push and pull factors playing a role that 
varies in significance and in magnitude over time and across countries. 
However, the synchronization of episodes around big or systemic events, the 
importance of global factors, and the evidence of spillovers of very specific 
push measures strongly suggests that large episodes of capital inflows, the so 
called surges, are mainly associated with push factors operating at a global 
level. Policies taken by the largest global economies seem to define a global 
financial cycle that spills over to the rest of the world.  The events of the spring 
of 2013 following the Federal Reserve’s announcement of its intent to move to 
a somewhat less expansionary phase of its monetary policy stance have done 
little to contradict that conclusion. 
 
2 The consequences: credit and asset prices booms and busts 
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Regardless of their causes, the consequences of surges in capital inflows 
may be a source of concern for policymakers. It is often stated that extreme (in 
terms of their magnitude, relative to the size of the economy, their persistence, 
or both) episodes of capital inflows may result in real exchange misalignments 
that hurt a country’s competitiveness. In the extreme, Dutch disease problems 
may arise or get exacerbated. Surging inflows fuel bubbles in key asset prices, 
such as real estate, that may threaten financial stability when they burst. A 
recent literature has used the techniques for identifying surges in capital 
inflows described above to characterize their consequences for credit growth, 
real exchange movements, as well as equity,  and housing prices. 
 
The starting point in this literature is  the identification of extreme episodes 
of capital inflows, using a variety of statistical methods and/or relying on 
events or chronologies similar to some of the methods discussed above. This 
literature generically refers to these episodes as “surges” or bonanzas (as in 
Reinhart and Reinhart, 2009) without considering the finer distinctions 
depending on the residency of the agents or the types of capital flows 
Differences across papers come mainly from variation in the filters used to 
define the surge or bonanza (including procedures to set  thresholds, cyclical 
adjustments, etc.)  
 
An issue that has received considerable attention in recent years has been the 
connection between capital inflow surges and credit booms and especially their 
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connection to crises. The chapter by Mendoza and Terrones , in this volume, 
focuses primarily on post-1960 credit booms and its determinants. A key 
finding of their analysis is that surges in capital inflows are an important 
determinant of credit booms (indeed, surges temporally precede credit booms), 
especially—but not exclusively-- among emerging markets.  As to financial 
crises, they note that not all credit booms end in crisis but all financial crises 
are preceded by lending booms. Schularik and Taylor (2012), who focus on a 
dozen advanced economies over 1870-2009 arrive at similar conclusions.  
A related literature has focused more directly on policy design, specifically 
taking into account the particular features of the relation between capital flows 
and bank lending. The chapter by Shin  shows how the abundance of funding in 
international financial centers is channeled worldwide by banks, fueling credit 
expansions overseas and making  banks in the recipient countries highly 
vulnerable to fluctuations in the availability of wholesale financing.  The 
departing point of his argument is that, contrary to the standard view that 
fluctuations in a bank’s leverage are due to their corporate finance decisions in 
terms of substituting equity for debt for a given level of assets, these 
fluctuations are mainly driven by growth in assets with a fixed level of equity. 
In this setting, banks borrow heavily and increase their leverage during 
expansions; the macroeconomic vulnerability introduced by rising leverage is 
discussed further in the next section.  Shin documents this hypothesis with 
evidence from Europe and Korea, showing that most of the expansion in bank 
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balance sheets is driven by borrowing in wholesale international interbank 
markets, rather than in expansions of retail deposits.  
The effect of capital flows on equity prices in the recipient economies is the 
subject of the work of Olaberria (chapter x). He studies the relation between 
cross border flows and equity price booms prices post 1990  paying special 
attention to the economic conditions that might mediate the relation between 
those variables. Specifically, he introduces proxies for the level of openness, 
the quality of institutions and the extent of financial development.  Booms in 
equity prices are defined as deviations from a long run trend. The results from 
applying this methodology to the data indicate that capital inflows have a 
sizable impact on equity prices only in emerging economies which is amplified 
by low institutional quality and modest financial development. This result, 
possibly owing to the definition of an equity boom used, is at odds with the 
episode-by-episode finding in Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) of a general rise in 
equity prices during the bonanza phase of the cycle. Beyond equity prices, Sá, 
et. al. (2011) focus on the nexus between real estate prices capital inflows, 
credit and monetary policy in OECD economies up to and including the run-up 
to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. Their results suggest that capital inflows 
have a significant and positive effect on real house prices, real credit to the 
private sector and real residential investment. Furthermore, the responses of 
housing variables to capital flow shocks are stronger in countries with more 
developed mortgage markets. 
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III. The demise: from inflows to outflows 
 
What happens in the economies that receive significant capital inflows when 
those inflows either cease (a sudden stop) or are altogether reversed? What if 
capital market access becomes very costly or altogether impossible? What 
becomes of the usually massive accumulation of private and public debt 
observed in recent year? Can we identify the channels through which 
disturbances in financial markets affect the real economy? These  questions are 
hardly academic it has been a source of recurring concerns for policy makers in 
emerging markets for decades and for many advanced economies more recently.  
Several of the papers included in this volume offer some insights from different 
and often complementary perspectives.  
 Reinhart and Rogoff  (chapter x) provide a of the major trends in private 
and government debt for emerging and industrialized since the late 19th century 
to the present. As discussed, high levels of domestic and external debt are 
intimately connected to previous surges in capital inflows (see, for example 
Mendoza and Terrones), which in turn, often end in systemic banking crises. 
The connection between debt and banking crises is “equal opportunity” 
affecting advanced and emerging economies alike. Banking crises, in turn, 
usually lead to a sharp deterioration in public finances and, in the most extreme 
cases, culminate in sovereign debt crises. The toll on output levels and growth 
is significant. Put differently, as Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) document, the 
probability of a banking crisis conditional on a capital flow bonanza (or surge) 
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in the preceding three years is significantly higher than the unconditional 
probability.  Comparable statements can be made about sovereign debt, 
currency and inflation crises.  The cumulative evidence that busts so often and 
predictably follow booms (albeit at uncertain timing) raises legitimate concerns 
for policymakers of the desirability of the boom in the first place. 
While Reinhart and Rogoff primarily focus on public debt (domestic and 
external) and total external debt (public and private).  The chapter by Mendoza 
and Terrones   analyzes primarily domestic credit to the private sector . Taken 
together these studies nearly complete the larger picture of leverage cycles.  
Nearly refers to the fact that shadow banking, off balance sheet transactions, 
and private and public arrears are all varieties of “hidden debts” that are not 
captured by the conventional aggregates but often only surface in moments of 
crises.  Mendoza and Terrones analysis covers all the industrialized countries as 
well 40 emerging economies; some of their most novel finding involve 
comparisons of these two groups.. Among their findings, is the somewhat 
surprising fact that the number of credit booms is remarkably similar in 
emerging and industrialized economies; the rapid increase in domestic bank 
credit is not a problem confined to less developed economies. An important 
implication of this is that countries should not expect to put episodes of 
financial instability behind as their income level raises reinforcing the need for 
appropriate financial supervision. There is no “graduation” from banking crises. 
As to the dynamics of output their analysis provides additional robust 
quantitative evidence that the capital inflow/credit boom phase is associated 
with above trend output (Figure 2) just as the capital flow reversal and credit 
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crunch phase is associated with recession and below trend growth.  The patterns 
are strikingly similar for advanced and emerging economies, with the latter 
showing deeper recessions in the aftermath of the credit boom. However, in 
light of the six-year contraction in many advanced economies following the 
credit boom that culminated in the Global Financial Crises extending their 
analysis beyond 2010 (when their sample ends) may yield equally severe post-
boom recessions in the industrialized economies, 
Mendoza and Terrones also show, that, consumption and investment fall 
below their trends in the demise of the credit booms and the magnitude is 
similar in the two groups of countries when the figures are normalized by the 
wider amplitude of the cycle in less advanced economies. A variable where 
there are significant differences among these groups of economies is in 
government consumption. In line with several of the papers in Céspedes and 
Galí (2012), fiscal policy in EM is found to expand significantly more above 
trend in the run up of domestic credit and contract more deeply in the downturn.  
As in Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) for capital flow bonanzas, another 
noteworthy result in Mendoza and Terrones is that the probability of currency 
crisis, banking crisis or Sudden Stops is higher during the tail end of the credit 
boom; although the first two are more common than the third.  
25 
 
Figure 2. Credit booms and economic activity
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Contributing to the analyses of boom-bust cycles, Fuentes and Saravia (chapter 
x) takes an in depth look to the mechanisms that might explain why real activity 
declines sharply in the wake of financial market turmoil. They focus on the case 
of Chile and exploit  a unique and rich data set of firms and their financing 
sources. The data they assemble lists all the banks that have extended loans to 
firms which have raised capital in domestic financial markets either through 
bonds or stocks. The balance sheet information of these firms plus the identity 
of its creditor banks is then merged with the financial statements of the banks 
making it possible to analyze if firms’ investment decisions during recessions 
and how it is influenced by the banks’ financial characteristics. The examine  
the question of whether banks that increased their leverage the most in the 
period prior to each crisis show the sharpest decrease in lending subsequently. 
Their analysis suggests this is the case and that the firms’ that contracted loans 
with the most leveraged banks are the ones that show the sharpest declines in  
investment. The novel micro-level evidence on the channels through which 
disturbances in financial markets during periods of financial distress affect 
developments in the real economy complements the broader findings already 
discussed. 
V.The policy responses: from capital controls to macroprudential 
 
Given the dire consequences that the financial crises of 2008-2009 had on the 
performance of many economies, policy makers and the academic community 
have devoted vast efforts to designing policy environments that can serve two 
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purposes: prevent the onset of another disruption and, if the crisis takes place, 
mitigate its effects. The papers contained in this volume also touch on these 
very important issues. 
 
The contribution of Shin has a special focuses on policies that pertain to 
the regulation of the banking sector. He gives a central role in his discussion of 
an appropriate regulatory framework to the non-core liabilities of the banking 
sector. As its name suggests, this source of funds of banks differ to the 
traditional retail deposits that constitute the traditional resource used by banks 
to sustain their lending. Non-core liabilities are provided instead by other 
financial intermediaries and are more volatile than core liabilities. Its volatility 
and usually quick retrenchment in periods of financial turmoil make them a key 
element to consider in the design of policies. Among non-core liabilities, Shin 
gives special attention to cross border lending channeled by foreign banks and 
most certainly denominated in a different currency than that of the recipient 
country. 
 
Shin proposes a useful taxonomy to establish three different types of 
macroprudential policies, all related to commercial banks: asset side tools, 
liabilities side tools and bank-capital oriented tools. In each category he 
discusses the relative merits of mostly well-known policies mentioning, when it 
is available, the available empirical evidence of their effects in preventing 
crises. The discussion of policies aimed to curtail the increase in non-core 
liabilities (i.e. liability side tools) is perhaps one of the most interesting. These 
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prescriptions have the potential to be welfare enhancing since they can bridge 
the gap between the private costs of this source of funds that usually comes 
from outside the country with its full social cost that includes its potential to 
originate a crises. Even though the different types of capital controls discussed 
have seem attractive in principle, the empirical evidence mentioned by Shin and 
Fratzscher (also in this volume) casts doubts on their ability to affect the total 
volume of non-core liabilities contracted by the banking sector. Nevertheless, 
as Shin mentions, capital controls have been associated to changes in the 
composition of capital flows biasing them towards those less associated to 
economic crises. 
 
The issue of capital controls is also analyzed in more depth by Fratzscher 
in this volume. The author takes an interesting perspective on this important 
policy discussion. Instead of revisiting the effects of adopting these restrictions 
to financial flows, Fratzscher examines the motivations that countries have to 
impose them. This is an important contribution to the empirical literature on 
this issue and surely of important policy implications. The main conclusion that 
the author draws from an extensive empirical analysis is that foreign-exchange 
goals and not financial stability concerns are the main drivers of restrictions to 
the cross border trade of financial assets. In other words, an intense 
appreciation of the local currency is the factor that is most important for policy 
makers when deciding to establish for currency controls. A pending issue and 
one that in all likelihood will motivate further research is if this traditional 
macroeconomic concern has lost ground to financial stability concerns in light 
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of the increased prominence of macroprudential tools in the recent policy 
debate. 
 
In his exposition of macroprudential policies in the chapter of this volume, 
Shin makes an important point: the interconnection between macroprudential 
and more traditional macroeconomic policies, such as in particular, monetary 
policy. One clear example of this is the implications that changes in the interest 
rate have for short term capital flows and hence for financial stability. In a 
world of increasing international financial integration, tighter domestic 
monetary conditions might be followed by an increase in capital inflows that in 
itself translates to higher credit growth and spending. The tradeoffs and 
challenges of coordinating domestic policy objectives in an open economy are 
the subject of the paper by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe in this volume. They 
present a simple model to illustrate the potential costs of keeping a pegged 
exchange rate regime in different degrees of financial integration. This work 
has important implications for the optimal degree of capital account openness 
for defaulter countries that are members of a currency union. 
 
Reinhart and Rogoff conclude by showing that according to the historical 
record reductions of the debt to GDP ratio have been achieved through defaults 
(partial or total), higher inflation or the use financial repression tools. Which of 
these surely unpleasant options is chosen depends on the institutional 
arrangements in place that constrain the choices of those in charge of economic 
policy.  
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